Beyond Ex Post Expediency—An Ex Ante View of Rescission and Restitution by Brooks, Richard R.W. & Stremitzer, Alexander
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 68 | Issue 3 Article 13
Summer 6-1-2011




Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Contracts Commons, and the Legal Remedies Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Richard R.W. Brooks and Alexander Stremitzer, Beyond Ex Post Expediency—An Ex Ante View of




Beyond Ex Post Expediency—An Ex Ante 
View of Rescission and Restitution† 
Richard R.W. Brooks∗ 
Alexander Stremitzer∗∗ 
Abstract 
It is commonly held that if getting a contractual remedy was costless 
and fully compensatory, rescission followed by restitution would not exist 
as a remedy for breach of contract.  This claim, we will demonstrate, is not 
correct.  Rescission and restitution offer more than remedial convenience.  
Rational parties, we argue, would often desire a right of rescission followed 
by restitution even if damages were fully compensatory and costless to 
enforce.  The mere presence of a threat to rescind, even if not carried out, 
exerts an effect on the behavior of parties.  Parties can enlist this effect to 
increase the value of contracting. 
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I.  Introduction 
Why provide a remedy in restitution for breach of contract?  One 
might imagine that a remedy in restitution only makes sense in cases where 
contract remedies are inadequate, or wholly absent, such as in those 
situations where there is no remedy at law due to a failure of formation or 
some technical defect.1  When something prevents an agreement from 
receiving adequate enforceability under contract law, restitution steps in 
and cleans up the mess, as it has for centuries.  But what about those cases 
where contract provides a perfectly adequate remedy; what purpose—other 
than perhaps expediency, or worse, mischief—is served by allowing a party 
to rescind the agreement and turn to restitution as if the contract and an 
adequate remedy for its breach did not exist?  Notwithstanding the 
transaction costs of pursuing the contract remedy, restitution here would 
seem dubious or, at best, duplicative.2 
We will show, however, that there is a purpose, a heretofore 
unappreciated economic purpose, of rescission and restitution, which 
manifests even where contract remedies are fully compensatory and 
costless to enforce.3  This is not to say that the economic argument we offer 
is the only or the essential function of rescission followed by restitution.  In 
making our argument, we are fully cognizant of the fact that the remedy of 
rescission and restitution also often promotes the economy that previous 
commentators emphasized.  Our principal aim is not to exclude other 
considerations, but rather to expand the scope of inquiry regarding 
rescission and restitution.  Indeed, we believe that the remedy’s long and 
pervasive existence—dating back to ancient Roman markets and likely 
earlier to the legal regimes of ancient Greece and Egypt—can best be 
understood only by appealing to its variable functions, including the one we 
identify. 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 31–35 
(2011) (providing remedies to a party who renders performance under an agreement that is 
ultimately unenforceable due to indefiniteness, lack of formality, illegality, inconsistency 
with public policy, incapacity of a party, or mistake, or due to some supervening condition 
or uncertainty of an obligation to perform nonetheless delivered under protest). 
 2. Cf. Andrew Kull, Restitution as a Remedy for Breach of Contract, 67 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1465, 1499 (1994) ("A party to a valid contract has no claim a priori to anything other 
than his contractual expectancy.  If the enforcement remedies were fully effective and 
costless, rescission would not exist as a remedy for default."). 
 3. This is also the main thesis in the authors’ Article, Richard R.W. Brooks & 
Alexander Stremitzer, Remedies On and Off Contract, 120 YALE L.J. 690 (2011). 
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Our argument begins with the well-known proposition that when 
promisors breach contracts, promisees normally prefer (legal costs aside) a 
remedy in contract to rescission and recovery of price paid.  Normally, 
expectation damages, the conventional remedy for breach of contract, are 
greater than the contract price.4  Hence, only in odd cases—cases of so-
called losing contracts, where realized value of performance turns out to be 
less than the price—is the option to rescind and pursue restitution 
preferable to expectation damages.5  In these cases, when the promisor 
breaches, the promisee gets a lucky break; the breach rescues her from the 
loss by giving her a right to rescind the contract and receive the price paid. 
But surely, it is commonly suggested, from an ex ante perspective, "rational 
parties would not bargain" for such a right.6  Our argument departs from 
this conventional wisdom. 
Rational parties, we argue, would often desire a right of rescission 
followed by restitution even if damages were fully compensatory and 
costless to enforce.7  The mere threat that a promisee may rescind, even if 
the threat is not carried out, exerts an effect on the behavior of the promisor, 
encouraging her to reduce the risk of rescission by increasing the value of 
performance to the promisee.  Parties may enlist this implied threat to 
increase the value of contracting.  
To illustrate, take a seller of goods who knows that the buyer has a 
right to rescind the contract if the goods are defective.  Because rescission 
is generally disfavored by the seller, she has incentive to reduce its 
incidence.  The remedy of rescission is available only if the goods delivered 
are sufficiently defective (that is, the quality of the goods falls short of the 
level specified or implied in the contract so much so as to constitute total 
breach) or if the goods are wrongly not delivered at all.8  The seller, of 
                                                                                                                 
 4. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 cmt. a (1981) (noting that 
expectation damages, v, ordinarily exceed reliance damages, which include the price, p, and 
any incidental reliance, r, made on the contract).  Hence the familiar chain of inequalities, 
that ex ante expectation is greater than reliance, which in turn is greater than restitution of 
benefits conferred to breacher:  v > p + r > p.  Note that if the price has not been paid up 
front this inequality would turn into v – p > r >0. 
 5. See Kull, supra note 2, at 1469 ("[R]estitution as an alternative remedy for breach 
of contract becomes interesting chiefly in cases where the aggrieved party has made an 
unfavorable bargain, a contract that he has been performing (or would have been obliged to 
complete) at a loss."). 
 6. Id. at 1477. 
 7. Moreover, even in cases where parties would not voluntarily bargain for such a 
regime, we show that the availability of rescission might still be socially desirable. 
 8. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 37(1) (2011). 
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course, is not without some control over the quality of the goods she 
produces or whether she delivers the goods at all.  Indeed, by investing in 
the quality of the goods, the seller can reduce the probability that the buyer 
will have the legal right to rescind.  Our argument derives from this basic 
insight.  Parties can enlist the threat of rescission to create efficient 
incentives to invest in quality.  They may therefore rationally desire a right 
to rescission and restitution even if contract remedies are correctly and 
costlessly administered.  
Part II briefly reviews the traditional arguments for and against 
granting rescission rights.  These arguments are all grounded in distribution 
and ex post transaction cost considerations.  In Part III, we make the case 
for efficiency and ex ante investment considerations.  We argue that if 
parties can elect between rescission and expectation damages, they can 
tailor incentives to efficiently invest in quality.  Part IV addresses the 
implications of our analysis for a troubling trend in modern contract law:  
There is a tendency to limit the availability of rescission, while, in cases 
where it is granted, to allow for generous ensuing remedies.  Our analysis 
suggests that the trend should be moving in the opposite direction.  In Part 
V, we argue that rejection and rescission are functionally equivalent and the 
ensuing remedy should be limited to restoration of price in both cases.  
Again, this is the exact opposite of many modern reformers’ 
recommendations. 
II.  Rationale for Limiting Rescission Rights 
Easy availability of rescission followed by restitution has been, for 
centuries, a source of great anxiety among legal authorities who fear it as a 
threat to commercial order and other normative values.  Responding to 
these fears, authorities have limited the ease with which rescission may be 
elected.  The arguments they allow for rescission and restitution, as an 
alternative to money damages or specific performance, are typically limited 
to fairness and expediency.  The Restatement (Third) of Restitution & 
Unjust Enrichment summarizes the point well:  "Unlike the case of 
rescission for fraud or mistake, the justification of rescission as an 
alternative remedy for breach is not the avoidance of unjust enrichment but 
a concern with fairness to the injured party combined with remedial 
economy."9 
                                                                                                                 
 9. Id. § 54 cmt. e. 
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The arguments against rescission and restitution tend to receive more 
weight when contract remedies are available.  Among these arguments is a 
long held concern that allowing the buyer to rescind a contract can lead to 
excessively harsh outcomes for the defendant.  Basic fairness and morality, 
often discussed in terms of unjust forfeitures for defendants or unjust gains 
to strategic plaintiffs, inform much of the resistance to rescission and 
restitution.  Efficiency arguments enter here too.  We will address two of 
these arguments before presenting our own efficiency justification for 
liberal rescission rights.  
First, rescission may lead to inefficient returns.  Just because a 
promisee values goods less than the contract price for them doesn’t mean 
that those goods aren’t nonetheless most efficiently allocated to her.  A 
tailored suit for a businesswoman may be worth less to her than the price 
she agreed to pay once she observes some shortcoming in the quality or 
design.  Should she exercise her right of rescission and receive restitution, 
the suit itself may still be best allocated to her—assuming the suit’s defect 
does not prevent its fashionable wear or other use.  Rescission can interfere 
with goods being put to their most valued uses.  Costless renegotiation, of 
course, would set things back on track.  Following rescission and 
restitution, the promisee and promisor (the businesswoman and the tailor in 
the example above) would reach a new agreement for delivery of the goods 
if the former still valued them more than the opportunity costs to the latter 
of delivering them.  But renegotiation is not costless and, indeed, is often 
prohibitively costly.  So sometimes inefficient returns would stay that way. 
This cost of the rescission remedy would have to be weighed against the 
benefits we identified. 
Second, the off-contract remedy may encourage inefficient 
expenditures by some parties looking for a contractual out as well as by 
other parties seeking to prevent that kind of opportunism.  Andrew Kull put 
the matter aptly when he observed that "[a]ny expenditure by the parties 
that is directed toward facilitating or avoiding reallocation of their existing 
contractual expectancies constitutes dead-weight loss."10  These 
expenditures may not prevent the goods from being put to their efficient 
uses (which is the first problem described above), yet they constitute a 
wasteful and inefficient use of resources notwithstanding the final 
allocation of the goods.  To elect rescission a promisee must show a 
material breach, which constrains strategic invocation of the off-contract 
remedy as well as the defensive anticipatory responses to such opportunistic 
                                                                                                                 
 10. See Kull, supra note 2, at 1506. 
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behavior.  Yet, even so, there remains room for strategic behavior by the 
parties, leading to wasteful expenditures.  This second type of ex post 
inefficiency, like the first, must be weighed against the ex ante benefits we 
have identified with rescission and restitution.  We have presented this 
argument more formally in other settings and we reiterate its essential 
structure in the next Section.11 
III.  An Ex Ante View of Rescission 
Our argument is relatively straightforward.12  Rescission followed by 
restitution is often undesirable for the seller, especially if the goods’ resale 
value is low.  Foreseeing the possibility of rescission by counterparties, 
sellers will therefore invest to enhance the quality of performance, thereby 
reducing the likelihood that the rescission right is triggered.  Through its 
effect on quality, the option to rescind and receive restitution may be 
enlisted by parties to promote efficient contracting.  The old concern about 
the stability of contracting is not entirely unfounded, but the problem is not 
primarily due to the ease with which parties are able to rescind following 
breach; rather, it is the remedy that follows rescission.  Hence, the final 
point of our argument:  The remedy in restitution following rescission 
should be limited to restoration of price or other conferred benefits to the 
promisor under the contract.  We now present this argument in more detail. 
A legal regime that always granted the remedy of rescission and 
restitution to both parties would effectively not enforce contracts at all.  
After investments are made, the distribution of surplus between the parties 
becomes a zero-sum game.  This implies that, whenever one party prefers to 
carry out the terms of the contract over rescinding the contract and 
determining the terms of trade in free renegotiations, the other party 
automatically prefers the opposite.  Hence, contracts would always be 
rescinded and subsequently renegotiated.  Anticipating renegotiation after 
relationship-specific investments are sunk, the seller underinvests, as she 
knows that the buyer would capture part of the surplus generated by her 
investment.  This is the famous hold-up problem.13 
                                                                                                                 
 11. See Brooks & Stremitzer, supra note 3; Richard R.W. Brooks & Alexander 
Stremitzer, On and Off Contract Remedies Inducing Cooperative Investments (Yale L. & 
Econ. Research Paper No. 396, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract =1524327. 
 12. The following discussion in this section appeared in substantial part in Brooks & 
Stremitzer, supra note 3, at 693, 708–10, 712–14, and is printed with permission of the Yale 
Law Journal. 
 13. See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM:  
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Yet, the legal right to rescind is not available when tender conforms to 
the contract.  A regime which allows the buyer to elect rescission only if the 
right is triggered by nonconforming delivery cannot only overcome the 
hold-up problem that arises if rescission rights were always available, it can 
also allow contracting parties to set optimal incentives for quality 
investments.  Indeed, it can be shown that for every possible quality level, it 
is possible to choose a price such that incentives to invest in quality are 
optimal.  
This claim is a strong one which is not obviously true. We formally 
demonstrate its validity elsewhere.14  The basic intuition, however, is easy 
to explain.  Whenever, according to the background legal regime to a 
particular contract, it is possible for the buyer to elect between rescission 
followed by restitution and expectation damages, the seller’s payoff from 
the contract depends on whether her tender exceeds the contractually 
required quality level.  If the tender falls short of required quality, the seller 
sometimes decides not to deliver at all and pays damages for total breach of 
contract.  In other cases the seller decides to deliver and the buyer accepts 
delivery but asks for damages for partial breach.  Still in other cases the 
buyer rescinds the contract and asks for restitution.  However, if the tender 
meets the required quality, the seller gets price minus cost.  It is possible to 
think of this payoff as a quality premium.  The higher this premium, the 
more attractive it will be for the seller to meet the quality requirement.  
Typically the seller is not in perfect control of the quality level she 
produces.  By investing more, she can, however, increase the probability of 
producing high quality.  Parties recognize that, at very low prices, 
investment in quality will be too small, while at very high prices, 
investment in quality will be too great.  Somewhere in between, however, 
they can always choose an intermediate price for which incentives are just 
right. 
                                                                                                                 
FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 61–67 (1985); Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver 
D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership:  A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 
94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986); Paul A. Grout, Investment and Wages in the Absence of 
Binding Contracts:  A Nash Bargaining Approach, 52 ECONOMETRICA 449 (1984); Oliver 
Hart & John Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56 ECONOMETRICA 755 
(1988); Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration, 
Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978); 
Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics:  The Governance of Contractual 
Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979). 
 14. See Richard R.W. Brooks & Alexander Stremitzer, On and Off Contract Remedies 
Inducing Cooperative Investments (Yale L. & Econ. Research Paper No. 396, 2009), 
available at  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1524327. 
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It is useful to contrast this result with a background legal regime where 
expectation damages are the only available remedy.  Here incentives to 
invest in quality are determined by the size of the damage payment to the 
buyer, which is based on the contractually stipulated or implied quality 
level.  Investment will generally be insufficient unless the parties set the 
required quality level very high.  Indeed, they would have to set quality at 
the highest possible level, which is why such contracts are often referred to 
as Cadillac contracts.15  A real-world example of such Cadillac contracts is 
the kind of contract offered by moving companies.16  Such contracts usually 
promise to deliver all the client’s belongings intact.  This is as valuable as 
the company’s performance can be because, most of the time, the company 
falls short of its promise and has to compensate its client.  However, we do 
not generally observe contracts that are breached so often.  One might be 
concerned about the transaction costs involved in assessing and haggling 
about damages.  Moreover, a contract that, by design, is breached almost all 
of the time is at odds with the very idea of a contract as a promise.  For 
these reasons, and perhaps others,17 Cadillac contracts, specifying the 
highest possible quality, are rarely observed in practice.  This leaves us with 
the conclusion that, whenever the only available remedy is expectation 
damages, the seller has incentives to invest in quality, but her investment 
will generally not be fully adequate to ensure the socially efficient outcome.  
By adding rescission to this legal regime, parties can create optimal 
investment incentives without having to stipulate unusually high quality 
levels that are breached most of the time.  When rescission becomes an 
available option, price, in addition to quality, plays a role.  With the 
rescission option, there are two levers for adjusting incentives:  the quality 
threshold and price.18  However, it is important to keep in mind that, when 
price acts as a lever to adjust incentives, it is not available as a tool to 
distribute the surplus among the parties (that is the role of the price in the 
case where only expectation damages were available as a remedy).  To 
achieve the distribution of surplus that reflects the parties’ respective 
                                                                                                                 
 15. Brooks & Stremitzer, supra note 3, at 707; Alexander Stremitzer, Standard Breach 
Remedies, Quality Thresholds, and Cooperative Investments, J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
(forthcoming 2012). 
 16. This example is due to Aaron S. Edlin, Cadillac Contracts and Up-Front 
Payments:  Efficient Investment Under Expectation Damages, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 98 
(1996). 
 17. Setting abnormally high quality requirements may be perceived as unfair and may 
lead to negative reciprocity on the part of producers. 
 18. Formally speaking, our result implies that only price is needed; for every quality 
threshold there exists a price that sets efficient incentives. 
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bargaining power, the parties therefore have to rely on up-front payments.  
These payments are independent of what otherwise happens in the 
contractual relationship.  If, for example, the price required to induce 
optimal investment is very low, the seller would be willing to accept the 
contract only if the buyer makes an "unrefundable down payment" or pays 
some money as a "flat-cost reimbursement."  On the other hand, if the price 
needs to be very high, the buyer will accept the contract only if he receives 
some up-front payment in money or in kind from the seller.  This could, for 
example, consist of extra services that the seller performs free of charge. 
Our result applies to a wide range of contracts.  It can be put to effect 
in construction contracts where, for example, the owner of a large 
suspension bridge wants to incentivize the contractor to invest in innovative 
dampers to reduce the vibration of the cables.19  It can be used in production 
contracts, such as where a patron wants to incentivize his tailor to employ 
care in designing his bespoke suit or where a car manufacturer who has 
outsourced the development of a new motor wants to create incentives for 
the engineering firm to invest efficiently in the motor design.  The 
mechanism can also be used in lease contracts by a tenant who wants to 
create incentives for the landlord to invest efficiently into the maintenance 
of the apartment.  In principle, it can also be used in insurance contracts:  A 
policyholder could make the insurer invest efficiently in the quality of its 
claims handling, or an insurer could make a policyholder invest efficiently 
in providing accurate information about underlying risks. 
Yet, the insurance contract serves to illustrate an important limitation 
of our argument.  First, our result relies on the fact that the rescinding party 
can make its counterparty suffer in the case of rescission.  This would be 
the case where a policyholder has an expensive house-insurance policy on 
which he has paid premiums for years, which he rescinds when the 
insurance company does not honor a claim for a stolen bicycle.  On the 
other hand, there are some types of insurance, such as accident and life 
insurance, where the payout to the policyholder if the insured event occurs 
is a multiple of the sum of prior premium payments received by the 
                                                                                                                 
 19. Remember that the parties can structure the contract in a way such that the 
contractor gets a positive payoff if the dampers are able to reduce vibration below acceptable 
levels but makes the contractor lose his investment if the quality of the dampers is non-
conforming and therefore allows the owner to rescind.  Hence, the contract employs both 
carrot and sticks to achieve the desired investments in damper quality.  For a case study of a 
real world project in which this problem played a role, see Alterbaum et al., The Femern 
Fixed Link:  A Case Study in the Optimization of Construction Contracts, Yale School of 
Management Case No. 10-040 (forthcoming 2011), available at 
http://nexus.som.yale.edu/ffl. 
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policyholder.  In these cases, the threat of rescission carries no bite since 
the insurer would be delighted to have the policyholder rescind and 
therefore forgo his claim.  The second limitation of our result is that, while 
it is possible through rescission rights to create incentives to take care, this 
might expose the party that is rescinded against to the risk of being harshly 
punished if it turns out that it made a mistake.  This would not be a problem 
if the party exposed to the risk of rescission were risk-neutral.  Yet take the 
example of the holder of an insurance policy who faces the threat of 
rescission for inadvertently having misrepresented relevant facts at the time 
the insurance contract was concluded.  Here, it is frequently the case that 
the policyholder is not risk-neutral, as risk aversion is one of the main 
motivations for purchasing insurance.20 
Finally, in many situations there are already strong investment 
incentives due to market pressures.  A company might invest in quality just 
to maintain a good reputation in the market.  One might be concerned that 
creating extra incentives to invest in quality through the legal system might 
add to the incentives already present and at times could lead to 
overinvestment.  This concern, however, is unfounded, as incentives do not 
add up in such an intuitive way.  The reason the legal regime we describe 
induces efficiency is that it makes the investing party face an expected 
payoff function from the transaction, which is maximized at a socially 
optimal investment level.  This implies that beyond that level, the extra cost 
from investing in quality exceeds the extra benefit.  Therefore, if 
investment levels are positive for some exogenous reason, the legal regime 
only creates additional incentives to the extent they fall short of the optimal 
investment level.  Of course, it may be the case that exogenous factors, like 
career concerns, by themselves prompt sellers to invest too much in 
quality.21  In these cases, the legal regime we describe can do nothing to 
reduce these excessive incentives and at the very least does not make them 
worse. 
                                                                                                                 
 20. In addition, there could be interesting cross-subsidization effects if the fact of a 
nonconformity is only discovered in the unlikely case that the insured event occurs.  Brian 
Barnes, Note, Against Insurance Rescission, 120 YALE L.J. 328 (2010).  For other motives 
for purchasing insurance besides risk aversion, see Victor P. Goldberg, The Devil Made Me 
Do It:  The Corporate Purchase of Insurance, 5 REV. L. & ECON. 543 (2009) (arguing that 
relative expertise in providing monitoring and screening services plays an important role). 
 21. See Bengt Holmström, Managerial Incentive Problems:  A Dynamic Perspective, 
66 REV. ECON. STUD. 169, 170 (1999) (describing the likelihood of this result in situations 
where a company or an employee is unknown and young and expects huge returns from 
establishing a good reputation early on—not unlike the law firm summer associate described 
in this text). 
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IV.  The Threat to Contractual Stability 
Modern reformers appear to embrace the idea of restricting access to 
rescission while allowing for generous ensuing remedies.  We believe this 
perspective has it exactly backward.  The cumulative availability of 
rescission and on-contract remedies, like expectation damages, threatens 
contractual stability, and the restriction of rescission in appropriate cases 
undermines ex ante quality investments. 
The best way to see the trouble caused by cumulative concurrence—
cumulative availability of rescission and contract remedies—is to consider 
the rationale of a buyer who can choose between expectation damages on 
the one hand and rescission followed by expectation damages on the other.  
It is obvious that the buyer cannot be worse off choosing expectation 
damages and rescission over expectation damages alone.  In some 
instances, however, the buyer can extract rents from the seller in return for 
the willingness to renegotiate rescission.  In such instances, the buyer will 
be better off.  Hence cumulative availability of on-contract and off-contract 
remedies threatens the stability of contracting much more than if rescission 
and expectation damages are mutually exclusive.  Moreover, cumulative 
concurrence makes providing incentives for optimal investment into quality 
much harder. 
Therefore, if courts are concerned about stability and efficiency of 
contracting as well as the potentially desirable effects of redistribution from 
the seller to the buyer, they should treat rescission and expectation damages 
as mutually exclusive.  The buyer should not be allowed to ask for damages 
beyond restitution if he has chosen to rescind.  Rescission should come at a 
price. 
V.  The Right to Reject 
As a matter of law, there are of course important distinctions between 
whether the goods are returned through rescission (annihilating the contract 
ab initio) or through rejection (preserving the contract) followed by 
recovery of price.22  These distinctions, however, do not affect the 
economic character of the exchange.  The goods are returned and the price 
is recovered in either case.  Hence, economic arguments for rescission 
                                                                                                                 
 22. For rejection, see U.C.C. § 2-601 (2003).  For rescission, which is referred to as 
"revocation of acceptance" see U.C.C. § 2-608 (2003).  We borrow here, from our prior 
article, Brooks & Stremitzer, supra note 3, at 720. 
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coming at a price also apply in cases of rejection, where it is generally 
accepted that expectation damages are still available after the price has been 
recovered.  The inquiry here is not one regarding legal form.  The question 
is about the economic effect of permissively allowing parties to return 
defective goods (through whatever legal device—rescission or rejection) 
and recoup damages on top of price.  
It sometimes seems that reformers, such as the drafters of the Uniform 
Commercial Code who have made the ensuing remedy after rescission more 
generous, have based their argument on a doctrinal argument by analogy.  
Why, they ask, should the buyer be allowed to ask for expectation damages 
after rejection but not after rescission?  But the argument also cuts the other 
way:  If the buyer’s remedy has traditionally been restricted to restoration 
of price after rescission, why should the same limitation not apply to the 
remedy after rejection, especially when, as we have identified, such a 
regime has very desirable welfare properties. 
VI.  Conclusion 
We began with a simple question that heretofore seemed to have an 
obvious answer.  Is rescission followed by restitution a sensible remedy for 
breach in a world where contract’s enforcement remedies are perfectly 
compensatory and costless to bring about?  The conventional answer is 
"No"—"[i]f the enforcement remedies were fully effective and costless, 
rescission would not exist as a remedy for default."23  We reject this 
convention.  The threat of rescission can encourage parties to invest in 
quality and thereby increase the value of their contractual exchange.  This is 
something the parties would value even in the hypothetical world of fully 
effective and costless enforcement, as well as in our less perfect one. 
There is a purpose to rescission followed by restitution that goes 
beyond remedial expediency and judicial economy.  For this reason we 
would encourage courts to give greater countenance to rescission, awarding 
it more liberally than traditional arguments would suggest.  At the same 
time, however, we would advocate limiting, in this context, the ensuing 
remedy in restitution.  Our recommended combination of "liberal access to 
rescission and a conservative ensuing remedy in restitution," is quite the 
opposite of contemporary reform proposals.  They would limit rescission 
more generally, and yet when allowing it, they would provide for generous 
                                                                                                                 
 23. See Kull, supra note 2, at 1499. 
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ensuing remedies.  From an economic perspective, that is exactly the wrong 
thing to do.  No doubt, liberal access to rescission has its costs, such as 
encouraging inefficient returns and opportunistic avoidance to obligations, 
but its benefits should not be overlooked.  These costs and benefits can be 
managed somewhat through the combined approach we advocate.  By 
allowing greater recourse to rescission, courts can encourage efficient 
cooperative investments.  By restricting the ensuing restitutionary remedy, 
courts can discourage the abuse of rescission.  
A final point:  nothing in our argument hinges on the goods being 
returned through rescission, as opposed to, say, rejection.  Therefore, our 
efficiency perspective would recommend that the remedy following 
rejection should be a return of price paid, if any—and not expectation 
damages—in order to bolster cooperative investment.  Additional 
considerations, legal and otherwise, of course may determine the practical 
implementation of these remedies.  That is as it should be.  As we said at 
the outset, our aim is to expand the scope of consideration of the doctrine, 
not limit it.  
  

